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000OOO000
)
CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON
COMPANY,

)

Petitioner,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

v.

Case No. 910265

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.
000OOO000
JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1987 & Supp. 1991)
and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (e)(ii) (1987 & Supp. 1991).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether Petitioner is a real property
contractor for purposes of the Utah Sales and
Use Tax Act, and therefore, liable for sales
tax on its purchases of steel plate and other
materials from Utah vendors.

II.

Whether imposition of Utah sales tax on
Petitioner's purchases from Utah vendors, for
which Petitioner will receive a tax credit in
California, results in double taxation of
Petitioner.

III. Whether Petitioner is subject to a 15%
penalty because it intentionally disregarded
the instructions of the Auditing Division of
the Utah State Tax Commission and failed to
pay Utah sales tax.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the decision of the Utah State Tax
Commission, this Court is governed by the Administrative
Procedures Act.

The act provides that this Court shall grant

relief only if the petitioning party can show substantial
prejudice because "the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law," or "the agency action is based upon a
determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court."
& (g) (19 89 & Supp. 1991).

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d)

This Court has determined that

""Substantial evidence' is that quantum and quality of relevant
evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to
support a conclusion."

Boston First Nat, v. Salt Lake City Bd.,

799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990).

2

STATUTES, RULES & RESOLUTIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3(a) (Supp. 1985)(Currently Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-12-103(1) (1) (1987 & Supp. 1991).
There is levied and imposed an excise tax on:
(a) The storage, use or other consumption in
this state of tangible personal property
purchased for storage, use, or other
consumption in this state . . . .
Tax Regulation S58 (1984)(Currently Utah Code Admin. P. R865-1958S)
a. Tangible personal property sold to real
property contractors and repairmen of real
property is generally subject to tax. The
person who converts the personal property
into real property is considered to be the
consumer of the personal property since he is
the last one to own it as personal property.
The contractor or repairman is deemed to be
the consumer of tangible personal property
used to improve, alter or repair real
property regardless of the type of contract
entered into, whether it is a lump sum, time
and material or a cost-plus contract. The
sale of real property is not subject to the
tax nor is labor performed on real property
subject to the tax. To give an example, the
sale of a completed home or building is not
subject to the tax, but the sale of materials
and supplies to contractors and
subcontractors are taxable transactions as
sales to final consumers.

c. Sales of materials and supplies to
contractors for use in out-of-state jobs are
taxable unless sold in interstate commerce in
accordance with regulation S44.

3

Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-4(g) (Supp. 1985)(Currently Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-12-104(27) (1987 & Supp. 1991)).
The storage, use, or other consumption in
this state of the following tangible personal
property is specifically exempted from the
tax imposed by this chapter:

(g) property whi^ch enters into and becomes an
ingredient or component part of the property
which a person engaged in the business of
manufacturing, compounding for sale, profit,
or use manufactures or compounds . . . .

Multistate Tax Compact, Article V, Utah Code Ann. § 59-22-1
(1953) (Currently Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-801 (1987)).
Each purchaser liable for the use tax on
tangible personal property shall be entitled
to full credit for the combined amount or
amounts of legally imposed sales or use taxes
paid by him with respect to the same property
to another state and any subdivision thereof.
The credit shall be applied first against the
amount of any use tax due the state, and any
unused portion of the credit shall then be
applied against the amount of any use tax due
a subdivision.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-401(3)(b) (1987 & Supp. 1991).
(3) The penalty for underpayment of tax is as
follows:

(b) If any underpayment of tax is due to
intentional disregard of law or rule, the
penalty is 15% of the underpayment.

4

26 U.S.C. 6653 (1986 & Supp. 1991).
(a) Negligence.(1) In general.- If any part of any
underpayment (as defined in subsection (c))
of tax required to be shown on a return is
due to negligence (or disregard of rules or
regulations), there shall be added to the tax
amount equal to 5 percent of the
underpayment.

(3) Negligence.- For purposes of this
subsection, the term "negligence" includes
any failure to make a reasonable attempt to
comply with the provisions of this title, and
the term "disregard" includes any careless,
reckless, or intentional disregard.
Resolution adopted by the Multistate Tax Commission at 1980
Annual Meeting.
WHEREAS, Article V of the Multistate Tax
Compact provides that a credit shall be
allowed against use tax liability for a sales
or use tax paid in another state with respect
to the same transaction; and
WHEREAS, the question has arisen as to
whether precedence in liability or in payment
shall prevail as the determinant as to which
state is required to allow the credit; and
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the
Multistate Tax Commission has always
interpreted said provision to mean that
precedence in liability shall prevail over
precedence in payment; and that the
Multistate Tax Commission continues to do so
and to recommend that all states abide by
this interpretation.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the assessment of Utah sales tax
against Chicago Bridge & Iron Company ("Petitioner") for the
period October 1, 1983, through December 31, 1985-

For the

period at issue, the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax
Commission ("Auditing Division") assessed Petitioner Utah sales
tax on its purchases from Utah vendors of steel plate and other
materials used in constructing large storage tanks.
On June 21, 1990, a formal hearing before the Utah
State Tax Commission ("Respondent") was held.

Transcript at 3.

On February 13, 1991, based on the evidence and testimony
presented at the hearing, Respondent issued its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of law, and Final Decision.

Record at 53.

In its

decision, Respondent found that Petitioner engages in a number of
activities at its Salt Lake facility, which, when acting in
concert with one another, show that in its overall operations
Petitioner is a "real property contractor" for purposes of the
Utah Sales and Use Tax Act.

Record at 57. Thus, Respondent

upheld the Auditing Division's assessment of Utah sales tax on
Petitioner's purchases from Utah vendors of steel plate and other
materials used in the construction of its tanks.

Idk

Respondent

rejected Petitioner's argument that credit should be given for
taxes paid on the sales at issue to other states, and that
6

imposition of Utah sales tax constitutes double taxation.

Id.

On Kay 7, 1991, Respondent issued a supplemental order finding
that imposition of a 15% penalty was appropriate because of
Petitioner's intentional disregard of Utah law as made known to
it by way of the Auditing Division's letter dated February 29,
1984, which instructed Petitioner regarding Utah tax law and
directed it to pay Utah sales tax on its future purchases.
Petitioner now appeals to this Court for review of Respondent's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of law, and Final Decision and its
supplemental order.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Petitioner's primary activity consists of the design,
fabrication, and installation of large storage tanks, pressure
vessels, and other large containers used for combining materials,
hereinafter referred to as "storage tanks."

Transcript at 24-29.

Petitioner owns and operates facilities throughout the United
States.

During the period at issue, Petitioner operated one of

its steel plate processing facilities in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Transcript at 16-17.
Most of Petitioner's contracts are what may be commonly
referred to as "furnish and install contracts" where Petitioner
contracts with customers to produce, deliver, and install
7

customized storage tanks.

Transcript at 10 & 37. Petitioner

begins by purchasing steel plate and other raw materials from
Utah vendors.

Transcript at 7, At Petitioner's Salt Lake

facility, the steel plate is cut and processed into components
which fit together to form the desired storage tank.

Transcript

at 21 & 22. These components are transported to the customer's
real property where, pursuant to contractual requirements,
Petitioner's employees erect and weld the parts together and
affix the storage tank to the customer's real property.
Transcript at 22-23.
Petitioner did not pay Utah sales tax on its purchases
from Utah vendors of steel plate and other materials which it
used in the construction of storage tanks.

Record at 54.

Rather, Petitioner billed its customers for tax at the final
destination point and remitted it to the state in which the
storage tank was installed.

Record at 54. During the period at

issue, Petitioner's contracts were primarily with customers in
California.

Transcript at 11. Hence, rather than pay Utah sales

tax on its purchases from Utah vendors, Petitioner paid taxes to
the state of California.

Id.

As a result of the ongoing disagreement between the
parties, the Auditing Division sent Petitioner a letter, dated
February 29, 1984, clarifying its position.
8

Record at 98. The

letter informed Petitioner that: (1) a deficiency assessment
covering the three year period ending June 30, 1975, had been
resolved in Petitioner's favor on the condition that Petitioner
would pay sales tax on its Utah purchases in the future; (2)
under the Utah tax rules, Petitioner is liable for sales tax on
its purchases of steel plate and other materials because it is
the consumer of those materials; and (3) where a taxable
transaction takes place in Utah prior to out of state use, Utah
taxes must be paid first.

Record at 98.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

The person who converts personal property into

real property is deemed the consumer of the property because that
person is the last one to own it as personal property.

Even

though a segment of its operations involve the fabrication of
steel plate, Petitioner is a real property contractor because its
operations require it to fabricate and install large storage
tanks upon its customer's real property.

Petitioner's purchases

are not exempt from Utah sales tax because exemptions are
construed against the one so claiming and Petitioner's showing of
a mere difference of opinion does not satisfy its burden of
proving that it is a "manufacturer" within the meaning of the
Utah Sales and Use Tax Act.

9

II.

Imposition of Utah sales tax upon Petitioner's

purchases will not subject it to double taxation.

Both Utah and

California are members of the Multistate Tax Commission which
provides that precedence in liability prevails over precedence in
payment and that member states must give credit for taxes paid
the state where the liability first arose.

Double taxation will

not result because Petitioner will receive a tax credit in
California for sales tax paid to Utah, the state where the
liability initially arose.
III. The Auditing Division, in a letter dated February
29, 1984, informed Petitioner that, as a consumer, it was liable
for Utah sales tax on its purchases from Utah vendors and
directed it to pay Utah sales tax on all future purchases.
Petitioner disregarded the Auditing Division's instructions and
failed to pay Utah sales tax on the purchases at issue. Hence,
the 15% penalty imposed by Respondent for the intentional
disregard of Utah law should be upheld.

ARGUMENT
I.

PETITIONER IS REAL A PROPERTY CONTRACTOR; ITS
PURCHASES OF STEEL PLATE AND OTHER MATERIALS ARE
SUBJECT TO UTAH SALES AND USE TAX.
The major issue of this appeal involves the taxation of

steel plate and other materials purchased by Petitioner from Utah

10

vendors which were fabricated and erected into large tanks on its
customer's property.

Respondent determined from the evidence

that Petitioner, as real property contractor, is the ultimate
consumer of the steel plate and other materials it purchased.
Therefore, Petitioner is liable for sales tax on its purchases of
materials.

Respondent's decision is supported by substantial

evidence and case law.
Under Utah law, a tax is levied on the purchaser for
the amount paid or charged for "[t]he storage, use, or other
consumption in this state of tangible personal property purchased
for storage, use, or other consumption in this state . . . ."
Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3(a) (Supp. 1985)(Currently Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-12-103(l)(l) (1987 & Supp. 1991)).
Tax Regulation S58 provides:
a. Tangible personal property sold to real
property contractors and repairmen of real
property is generally subject to tax. The
person who converts the personal property
into real property is considered to be the
consumer of the personal property since he is
the last one to own it as personal property.
The contractor or repairman is deemed to be
the consumer of tangible personal property
used to improve, alter or repair real
property regardless of the type of contract
entered into, whether it is a lump sum, time
and material or a cost-plus contract . . . .

c. Sales of materials and supplies to
contractors for use in out-of-state jobs are
11

taxable unless sold in interstate commerce in
accordance with regulation S44.

Tax Regulation S58 (1984)(emphasis added)(Currently Utah Code
Admin. P. R865-19-58S).

Unless sold in interstate commerce, any

tangible personal property purchased for consumption in this
state by a real property contractor is subject to Utah sales tax.
Respondent found from the evidence that Petitioner, by
fabricating and installing storage tanks outside of Utah,
performed the work as a real property contractor.

In its

decision, Respondent stated:
Although the Petitioner may indeed be
engaged in manufacturing at its Salt Lake
facility, the activities at that facility is
but one of a number of different activities
that the Petitioner is engaged in, which,
when acting in concert with one another, show
the Petitioner in its overall operation to be
a "real property contractor•"
In the present case, the evidence
established that the Petitioner engages in
designing, manufacturing, and final assembly
of large steel products, which, when affixed
to real property, become a fixture to that
real property.
Record at 56.

Respondent's determination is supported by

substantial evidence and case law.
As the record indicates, Petitioner's contracts were
"furnish and install" contracts whereby Petitioner contracted
with customers to fabricate, erect and install specified storage
12

tanks on the client's real property.

To fulfill these contracts,

Petitioner first purchased steel plate and other materials from
Utah vendors. At Petitioner's Salt Lake facility, the steel
plate was cut and processed into storage tank components, which,
when eventually assembled at the job site, would become a storage
tank.

Admittedly, this segment of Petitioner's operations may be

described as a manufacturing process.

However, as Respondent

reasoned in its decision, "that determination . . . is not
dispositive of the outcome of this case."

Record at 56. Rather,

it is the general scope of the a taxpayer's activities which
determines whether it is a contractor and therefore a consumer of
goods.

Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. Sterling Custom Homes, 283

N.W. 2d 573, 574 (Wis. 1979) .
The components, while in some instances pieced together
to check specifications, were never assembled and welded into the
final structure at Petitioner's Salt Lake facility.

Petitioner

transported the components to the job site where it completed its
contractual obligations by welding together the various tank
components and affixing the tank to the customer's real property.
Hence, Petitioner's activities, when viewed in their entirety,
support the conclusion that it is a real property contractor.
Case law also supports Respondent's conclusion that
Petitioner is a real property contractor liable for sales tax on
13

its steel plate purchases from Utah vendors.

Levine v. State Bd.

of Equalization of the State of California, 299 P.2d 738 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Miedema Metal Building Systems, Inc., v.
Department of Treasury, 338 N.W.2d 924 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
In Levine the Appellant engineered, fabricated, and
installed water cooling towers, aerial towers, and industrial
wooden products especially designed for industrial companies.
Appellant purchased raw materials from California vendors and
processed them for subsequent erection and installation on
customers' job sites outside of California.

In rejecting

Appellant's argument that imposition of taxes violated the
Commerce Clause of the federal constitution, the court stated:
The appellants were engaged in the business
of constructing tanks and the items
heretofore mentioned, which were fabricated
pursuant to contracts to be erected on real
property outside of the state. In our
opinion they were, under the facts of these
particular cases, contractors within the
meaning of the law of this state, and were
consumers. It was said in General Electric
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 111
Cal.App.2d 180, 187, 244 P.2d 427, 431: v* *
* Where the materials are combined with other
materials so as to lose their identity and
become part of the completed structure the
contractor is deemed to be the consumer of
such material * * *.'
Id. at 743.
In Miedema the appellant was a corporation that sold
and constructed grain storage bins.
14

The storage bins were

erected by the appellant on farms. The Michigan Court of Appeals
upheld the Michigan Tax Tribunal's determination that because the
taxpayer sold the storage bins and assembled them on the
customer's real property, the taxpayer was a "contractor" and
hence the "consumer" for purposes of the tax.

The appellant was

liable for payment of tax on the cost of the bins.

Miedema, 338

N.W.2d at 926 & 927.
The evidence and case law both support Respondent's
conclusion that Petitioner, as a real property contractor, is
liable for sales tax on its purchases from Utah vendors of steel
plate and other materials used in the construction of storage
tanks.

A.

PETITIONER'S PURCHASES OF STEEL PLATE AND
OTHER MATERIALS ARE NOT EXEMPT UNDER UTAH
CODE ANN. § 59-16-4(g).
Under Utah tax law, "property which enters into and

becomes an ingredient or component part of the property which a
person engaged in the business of manufacturing, compounding for
sale, profit or use manufactures or compounds . . ."is exempt
from Utah sales and use tax.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-4(g) (Supp.

1985)(Currently Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(28) (1987 & Supp.
1991)).

Petitioner argues that because it engages in some

manufacturing operations at its Salt Lake facility that it's
15

purchases of steel plate and other materials were exempt from
sales tax under section 59-16-4(g).

However, Petitioner has

failed to show that it is a "manufacturer" within the meaning of
section 59-16-4(g).

Rather, Petitioner merely establishes that a

difference of opinion exists between itself and Respondent which
is insufficient to qualify it for the exemption.
Tax exemption statutes are narrowly construed against
the taxpayer and thus Petitioner bears the burden of showing its
entitlement to the exemption.

Parson Asphalt Products v. Utah

State Tax Common, 617 P.2d 397 (1980).

In Parsons, this Court,

in rejecting the taxpayer's argument that fuels it used in
reconstructing a causeway were exempt from Utah's Use Fuel Tax,
stated:
Even though taxing statutes should generally
be construed favorable to the taxpayer and
strictly against the taxing authority, the
reverse is true of exemptions. Statutes
which provide for exemptions should be
strictly construed, and one who so claims has
the burden of showing his entitlement to the
exemption.
Id. at 398. Moreover, this burden is not met merely by showing a
difference of opinion.

Container Corp. of America v. Franchise

Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).

In Container Corp., the Supreme

Court stated:
v

The general rule, applicable here, is that a
taxpayer claiming immunity from a tax has the
burden of establishing his exemption. This
16

burden is never met merely by showing a fair
difference of opinion which as an original
matter might be decided differently, . . .'
Id. at 175-76 (quoting Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340
U.S. 534 (1951))(original emphasis).

In order to qualify for the

manufacturing exemption of section 59-16-4(g), Petitioner must
show more than a mere difference in opinion between itself and
Respondent.
However, a mere difference of opinion is all that
Petitioner has shown.

Petitioner cites to portions of the record

which establish nothing more than the fact that, in fulfilling
its "furnish and install contracts," an isolated portion of its
activities involve fabricating steel plate into storage tank
components.

Petitioner wholly overlooks the fact that its

contracts further require it to transport those components to the
customer's job site and erect and install the storage tank upon
its customer's property.

Because tax exemption statutes are

construed strictly against the one claiming the exemption,
Petitioner cannot broadly construe section 59-16-4(g) to include
itself merely because an isolated portion of its activities
involve steel plate processing.

17

II.

RESPONDENT'S POSITION WILL NOT SUBJECT
PETITIONER TO DOUBLE TAXATION AND IS NOT
INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT.
Petitioner asserts that the Commission's Order subjects

it to double taxation.

Petitioner quotes extensively from

Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Johnson, 119 P.2d 945 (California
1941) as supporting this argument.

In that case, the California

court upheld a use tax assessment against Petitioner, which was
measured by the cost of materials Petitioner transported into and
used in California.

Petitioner had not paid sales or use tax on

those materials to any other state.

The main issue involved a

question of whether the use tax constituted an impermissible
burden on interstate commerce.

The position urged by Petitioner

was that it was not taxable at all because when goods are
purchased in a foreign state, prefabricated and shipped to
California in interstate commerce, to tax Petitioner on the cost
of those materials would impose an invalid burden on interstate
commerce.

The court held that the use tax did not constitute an

unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.

The only issues

decided were that the California State Board had imposed a use
tax on the transaction, that such tax was valid, and that the tax
was not an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.

It did

not address the issue here: whether Petitioner must pay taxes to

18

California to the exclusion of other states.

This question is

resolved by referring to the Multistate Tax Compact.
Both Utah and California are members of the Multistate
Tax Commission; both have adopted, and adhere to, the language of
the Multistate Tax Compact.

The question of double taxation is

resolved pursuant to this agreement.

Article V of the Compact

(codified at Utah Code Ann. § 59-22-1 (1953), currently Utah Code
Ann. § 59-1-801 (1987)) states:
Each purchaser liable for the use tax on
tangible personal property shall be entitled
to full credit for the combined amount or
amounts of legally imposed sales or use taxes
paid by him with respect to the same property
to another state and any subdivision thereof.
The Multistate Tax Commission has interpreted the above cited
Article V to mean:
WHEREAS, Article V of the Multistate Tax
Compact provides that a credit shall be
allowed against use tax liability for a sales
or use tax paid in another state with respect
to the same transaction; and
WHEREAS, the question has arisen as to
whether precedence in liability or in payment
shall prevail as the determinant as to which
state is required to allow the credit; and
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the
Multistate Tax Commission has always
interpreted said provision to mean that
precedence in liability shall prevail over
precedence in payment; and that the
Multistate Tax Commission continues to do so
and to recommend that all states abide by
this interpretation.
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Resolution adopted by Multistate Tax commission at 1980 annual
meeting.
Pursuant to Article V, California will give credit to
Petitioner for taxes paid in Utah on the same purchases.

During

the periods at issue here, the tax liability arose first in Utah.
California does not tax Petitioner until the materials enter that
state.

If Petitioner had properly paid tax in Utah, credit would

have been allowed by California for the amounts paid here. No
double taxation would have resulted.

Precedence of liability

prevails over precedence of payment.
Petitioner should not confuse double payment with
double taxation.

Utah does not seek to doubly tax Petitioner,

nor does California.

Utah seeks only those taxes legally owed

here, and if properly paid, such taxes will be given credit in
California.

If taxes have been erroneously paid to one state

when legally due in another, a refund should be sought in the
state where erroneously paid.
Further, the Commission's position is not internally
inconsistent as asserted by Petitioner in its brief.

Utah will

indeed assess a use tax on purchases of personal property made
outside the state where it is shipped into the state for use,
storage, or other consumption.

However, where a sales tax has

been paid to another state on the purchase of that personal
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property, a credit against the use tax will be given by Utah for
the amount of sales tax paid to that state.
Finally, Petitioner cites to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12104(33), (1987 & Supp. 1991)(enacted in 1988)1, as granting an
exemption for the types of purchases at issue.

However, before

Petitioner can claim that its purchases are exempt under section
59-12-104(33), it must concede the primary issue of this appeal:
that it is a real property contractor for purposes of the Utah
Sales and Use Tax Act.

Further, a full reading of subsection 33

actually mandates taxation of Petitioner's purchases from Utah
vendors.

Subsection 33 exempts:
sales of tangible personal property to
persons within this state that is
subsequently shipped outside the state and
incorporated pursuant to contract into and
becomes a part of real property located
outside of this state, except to the extent
that such other entity or political entity
imposes a sales, use, or gross receipts, or
other similar transaction excise tax thereon
against which such other state or political
entity allows a credit for taxes imposed by
this chapter.

California imposes a use tax on Petitioner based upon its use of
materials brought into California but allows a credit under
1

It should be noted that the 1989 amendments to Utah Code
Ann. § 59-12-104 added subsection (34)(currently section 59-12104(33)). Because this subsection of the code was amended after
the date the issues arose in the case at bar, it should not be
considered a controlling statute. Tummurru Trades v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715, 718 n. 10. (Utah 1990).
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Article V of the Multistate Tax Compact for the taxes paid to
Utah,

Petitioner is therefore liable under subsection 33 and

must pay Utah sales tax on its purchases from Utah vendors and
apply for a credit from California.

III. PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO THE 15% PENALTY BECAUSE
OF ITS INTENTIONAL DISREGARD OF THE LAW.
Under Utah law, a penalty is imposed for underpayment
of taxes:
The penalty for underpayment of tax is as follows:

(a) If any underpayment of tax is due to
intentional disregard of law or rule, the
penalty is 15% of the underpayment.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-401(3) (a) (1987 & Supp. 1991).
Accordingly, Respondent imposed a 15% penalty upon Petitioner
"based upon the Petitioner's apparent intentional disregard of
law or rule as made known to it by way of the letter from the
Commission dated February 29, 1984."

Record at 35. The letter

to wjiich Respondent referred, was a letter sent by the Auditing
Division to Petitioner outlining its position on Petitioner's
material purchases from Utah vendors.

The letter, after

referring to a previous assessment and settlement of that
assessment in Petitioner's favor, advised Petitioner that where a
taxable transaction takes place in Utah prior to use in another
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state, Utah law must be satisfied regardless of other state law.
Then, the letter, citing Tax Rule S-58 (Currently Utah Code
Admin. P. R865-19-58S), advised Petitioner that real property
contractors are deemed the final consumer of materials they
purchase.

Finally, the letter instructed Petitioner that it was

to pay Utah sales tax on any future purchases from Utah vendors
regardless of where the materials were used.

Nevertheless,

Petitioner ignored the Auditing Division's directive and failed
to pay any sales tax on its purchases of materials used out of
state.
The term "intentional disregard," as it is used in
section 59-1-401(3)(a), has been neither defined by the
legislature nor interpreted by this Court.

Therefore, it is

instructive to look at the federal standard when imposing
penalties for the nonpayment of tax.
The Internal Revenue Code imposes a penalty for the
underpayment of taxes when underpayment is due to the "disregard
of rules or regulations."
1991).

26 USC § 6653(a)(1) (1986 & Supp.

For the purposes of section 6653(a), "the term

'disregard' includes any careless, reckless, or intentional
disregard."

26 USC § 6653(a)(3) (1986

Supp. 1991).

Further,

when a penalty is assessed under section 6653(a)(3), the taxpayer
bears the burden of proving that he did not intentionally
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disregard rules and regulations. Marcello v. C.I.R., 380 F.2d
499, 507 (5th Cir. 1967); accord, Masat v. C.I.R, 784 F.2d 573,
576 (5th Cir. 1986) .
In the present case, Petitioner failed to prove it did
not intentionally disregard Utah tax regulations.

The letter

evidences a long standing disagreement between the Auditing
Division and Petitioner regarding Utah sales tax.

Further, it

indicates that the Auditing Division made repeated efforts to get
Petitioner to comply with Utah sales tax law.

Despite the

Auditing Division's efforts, Petitioner neither paid sales tax on
the purchases at issue nor sought further clarification of the
matter with the Auditing Division.

Using the standard set forth

in section 6653(a), Petitioner's actions demonstrate an
intentional disregard of the law.
In its brief, Petitioner, cites to 26 USC §
6651(a)(1986 & Supp. 1991), which imposes a penalty for failing
to file a return or to pay the amount shown on a filed return.
Under section 6651(a), a penalty is not imposed if the failure to
file a return or pay the amount shown on a return was due to
"reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect."

However,

section 6651(a) does not directly apply to the case at bar
because it deals with situations where the taxpayer has either
failed to file a return or has filed a return but not paid the
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amount due as shown on the return.

Petitioner cannot demonstrate

that its nonpayment of Utah sales tax was not due to "willful
neglect," but due to "reasonable cause."
The Supreme Court has interpreted this statute and held
that "reasonable cause" calls on the taxpayer to demonstrate that
he exercised "ordinary business care and prudence."
Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 (1985).

U.S. v.

Further, as used within section

6651, ""willful neglect' may be read as meaning a conscious,
intentional failure or reckless indifference."

Id.

Petitioner argues that by relying upon Chicago Bridge &
Iron Co. v. Johnson, 119 P.2d 945 (California 1941), and paying
taxes to California, it was exercising "ordinary business care
and prudence," and hence should not be subject to the 15%
penalty.

Reliance upon a single case which did not address the

issue of whether Utah sales tax was due in opposition to the
Auditing Division's express ruling, can hardly constitute
"ordinary business care and prudence."

Rather, a prudent

business person in Petitioner's situation would have, with
minimal effort, discovered that California is a member of the
Multistate Tax Commission and would have given credit for payment
of Utah sales tax.

Petitioner's actions evidence a "conscious,

intentional failure or reckless indifference" toward compliance
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with Utah law.

Therefore, even under the standard of section

6651(a), the imposed 15% penalty should be upheld.
Petitioner, a multistate corporation that constantly
deals with interstate taxing transactions, is hard pressed to
argue that its nonpayment of Utah sales tax was due to anything
but an "intentional disregard" of Utah law.

Hence, the 15%

penalty imposed by Respondent should be affirmed by this Court.

CONCLUSION
Respondent found from the testimony and the evidence
presented at the formal hearing that Petitioner's activities,
when viewed in their entirety, show it to be a real property
contractor.

Because real property contractors are deemed the

consumers of the tangible personal property they purchase,
Petitioner is liable for Utah sales tax on its purchases of steel
plate and other materials purchased from Utah vendors.
Petitioner's purchases do not qualify for a
manufacturing exemption merely because some of its activities
involve steel plate processing.

Tax exemption statutes are

narrowly construed against the one claiming an exemption and
Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that it is a
"manufacturer" within the meaning of the Utah Sales and Use Tax
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Act.

Petitioner has not met its burden by merely showing a

difference of opinion between itself and the Auditing Division.
Respondent's position will not subject Petitioner to
double taxation and it is not internally inconsistent.

Utah and

California are both members of the Multistate Tax Commission
which requires member states to give credit for taxes paid to the
state in which the tax liability first arose.

Petitioner's

liability for Utah sales tax arose first when it purchased steel
plate to construct storage tanks before any liability ever arose
in California.

Hence, Petitioner is not eligible for a tax

credit in Utah for taxes paid to California.

Rather, Petitioner

must pay Utah sales tax on its purchases and seek a credit or
refund for taxes paid to the state of California.
Petitioner was fully aware of its Utah sales tax
liability.

The letter from the Auditing Division, dated February

29, 1984, instructed Petitioner regarding Utah law and directed
it to pay Utah sales tax on all of its future purchases of steel
plate and other materials.

However, Petitioner disregarded the

Auditing Division's directive and failed to pay Utah sales tax on
the purchases at issue.

Petitioner's intentional disregard of

Utah law justifies imposition of the 15% penalty.
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For the forgoing reasons, Respondent respectfully
requests this Court to affirm its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Final Decision and its supplemental order.
Dated this ffi '

day of October, 1991.

^.«.yDE\JER
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
lis
I hereby certify that on this

1991,

*^

day of October,

I delivered four true and accurate copies of the foregoing

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, first class, postage prepaid, to:
Ronald G. Moffitt
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, #1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorney for Petitioner
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